The Economic Impact of Immigrant-Related Local Ordinances by unknown
THE ECONOMIC  
IMPACT OF 
IMMIGRANT-RELATED 
LOCAL ORDINANCES
For further information about  
AS and COA, please write to AS/COA at 
680 Park Avenue,  
New York, NY 10065  
or visit AS/COA Online at  
www.as-coa.org
Together, Americas Society and Council of the Americas (AS/COA) unite 
opinion leaders to exchange ideas and create solutions to the challenges 
of the Americas today. 
The Americas Society (AS), the recipient of a grant from the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund to produce this report, is the premier forum dedicated 
to education, debate and dialogue in the Americas. Its mission is to 
foster an understanding of the contemporary political, social and 
economic issues confronting the Americas, and to increase public 
awareness and appreciation of the diverse cultural heritage of the 
Americas and the importance of the inter-American relationship.1
The Council of the Americas (COA), affiliate organization to AS, is the 
premier international business organization whose members share 
a common commitment to economic and social development, open 
markets, the rule of law, and democracy throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. The council’s membership consists of leading international 
companies representing a broad spectrum of sectors including banking 
and finance, consulting services, consumer products, energy and 
mining, manufacturing, media, technology, and transportation.2
 1  The Americas Society is a tax-exempt public charity described  
in 501(c)(3) and 509(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
 2  The Council of the Americas is a tax-exempt business league under  
501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and as such, actively pursues 
lobbying activities to advance its purpose and the interests of its members.
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT-RELATED LOCAL ORDINANCES 1
F
ailure by the U.S. Congress to pass 
comprehensive immigration reform 
has created a vacuum in immi-
gration policy that is increasingly 
being filled by state and local legis-
latures seeking to enact their own immi-
gration laws. Some bills, like Arizona’s SB 
1070, Georgia’s HB 87 or Alabama’s HB 56, 
are aimed at limiting undocumented immi-
grants’ access to jobs and public services, but 
in some cases they have fueled discrimina-
tion toward immigrants and Latinos over-
all. Other legislation such as “sanctuary 
city” ordinances strives to create a welcom-
ing environment for residents, regardless 
of migratory status, or to attract new immi-
grant populations or maintain existing ones.
All of these bills reflect anxieties in many 
parts of the country. While the focus might 
be different, these policies share a concern 
about the effects of immigration in dis-
tinct communities and the need for bet-
ter policies to manage migration flows.
At this time of growing local-level, immi-
gration-related legislation and ordinances, 
Americas Society, with support from the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, seeks to contrib-
ute to the discussion by determining and 
analyzing the economic effects of such pol-
icies. In a context of high unemployment 
and lackluster business growth, we believe it 
essential to provide a better understanding 
of how policies that seek to restrict immi-
gration and those that support more flexible 
approaches affect, if at all, the overall busi-
ness environment. These policies are gener-
ally aimed at the undocumented population 
but can result in unintended consequences 
for the overall immigrant population and for 
other groups as well. In difficult economic 
times, we should be mindful of policies that 
may restrict business growth or job creation.
Recognizing that the immigration debate 
in the United States is impassioned and 
often divisive, Americas Society’s Hispanic 
Integration and Immigration Initiative pro-
motes dialogue among the private and pub-
lic sectors and community groups and raises 
awareness of the socioeconomic situation 
of immigrants and Latinos overall in cities 
across the United States. Americas Society, 
in collaboration with its affiliate organi-
zation, Council of the Americas (COA), has 
worked since 2007 to facilitate immigrant 
integration and increase the economic devel-
opment in new immigrant destinations.
Building on its work in cities across the 
country, Americas Society commissioned 
research—the results of which are 
published in this white paper—to study the 
effects of restrictive versus non-restrictive 
immigration-related local ordinances 
on cities’ economies. Our objective is 
to move the public discussion around 
immigration away from party lines and 
emotions, and center it instead on the 
economic implications of various policies. 
Greater understanding of the economic 
impacts of immigration policy and the 
immigrant community as a whole can 
help Americans develop better-informed 
perspectives on the immigration debate.
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S
ince 2005, in a climate of increas-
ing concern and urgency about the 
nation’s current and future migra-
tory flows, cities and states around 
the country have been spurred to 
take action and pass ordinances or laws that 
respond to local immigration dynamics.
The majority of legislative action—and the 
policies receiving the bulk of public atten-
tion—focuses on restrictive policies, which, 
at the city level, generally include four types 
of ordinances: business verification of the 
immigration status of employees; require-
ments that landlords verify the immigra-
tion status of tenants; 287(g) agreements 
that give local officials immigration enforce-
ment powers; and English-only. At the state 
level, restrictive policies extend to cover 
health care, education, transportation, and 
other areas under shared state jurisdiction.
Still, although fewer in number, other cit-
ies and states have opted for non-restric-
tive policies toward the undocumented 
immigrant population. These locali-
ties, referred to as sanctuary cities, pro-
vide access to public services and bar local 
law enforcement and city employees from 
investigating the legal status of residents.
Although restrictive and non-restrictive 
polices are aimed at the undocumented 
immigrant population, the political and eco-
nomic climate that they both respond to and 
create affects the overall immigrant popu-
lation, as well as U.S.-born Latinos.1 That is 
one reason it is imperative to better under-
stand the economic effects of these polices.
Furthermore, at a time of high unem-
ployment and economic uncertainty, 
immigration-related policies should also 
be understood in the context of how 
they affect the local business environ-
ment, which is defined here (based on 
available data) as the number of busi-
nesses and employees in a given locality.
This white paper seeks to contribute to 
discussions on local immigration-related 
policies by comparing the average effects of 
restrictive versus non-restrictive ordinances 
on a city’s business environment and then 
isolating the individual implications of each 
of the four types of restrictive ordinances. 
To accurately measure the passage and post-
passage effects over time, the focus is on 
cities that passed ordinances in the 2006–
2008 period, which were still being enforced 
through 2009. State policies—especially 
those receiving recent national attention—
are not considered due to the period of the 
study and the challenges in comparing 
the macrolevel business environment 
across states. But city-level results can 
provide lessons learned for state officials.
Findings indicate that, on average, the 
impact of restrictive ordinances on the busi-
ness environment (as measured in this white 
paper) is mixed: they have a negative impact 
on the number of employees but not on the 
number of businesses in a given city. This 
could be a result of such ordinances driving 
out members of the labor force. Among the 
four types of restrictive ordinances exam-
ined, employment-related measures have 
the greatest effect on the decrease in the 
number of employees in restrictive cities.
But the results should not be looked 
at solely through the prism of a reduc-
tion in the number of employees. 
Instead, the larger macroeconomic 
effects of lost jobs must be considered as 
well: the likely contraction in consump-
tion and possible business closures.
Further, the period of analysis does not 
allow for an examination of the fallout 
from the financial crisis and the pressures 
that employment-restrictive ordinances 
may place on the workforce in that envi-
ronment. But even with these limita-
tions, this white paper points to a series 
of long-term concerns. This bears implica-
tions for policymakers across the country.
Executive Summary
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Introduction
I
mmigration defines United States history, 
but it is one of the most polarizing issues 
in the public policy debate. However, all 
sides do agree on one point: U.S. immi-
gration policy and our current immi-
gration system are not effective. At a time 
of high unemployment and national con-
cerns about job creation, understanding the 
relationship of immigration to economic 
growth is essential. A central question is 
what types of immigration policies are more 
likely to support economic growth. This 
paper examines the importance of immigra-
tion policy to the health of the U.S. economy.
The power to reform immigration poli-
cies has long been within the scope of the 
federal government. Until recently, a land-
mark Supreme Court decision in 1976 stating 
that “the power to regulate immigration is 
unquestionably exclusively a federal power” 
was seen as relatively uncontroversial.2 But 
two developments have spurred recent state 
and local action on immigration: unprec-
edented levels of undocumented immigra-
tion (11 million are estimated to be living in 
the U.S. today) and the settlement of immi-
grants—particularly from Latin America—
in new destinations that, until recently, 
had not experienced high levels of migra-
tion. Although state and local action tar-
gets undocumented immigrants, the 
influx of authorized immigrants to new 
gateway cities has also raised concern in 
some communities about how to respond 
to the changing social makeup. Despite 
these demographic and policy shifts, Con-
gress remains unable or unwilling to pass 
legislation that responds to the chang-
ing characteristics of migration flows.
The federal government’s inaction is 
deeply dissatisfying to immigration restric-
tionists and non-restrictionists alike. The 
restrictionists wish to see the flow of 
immigrants, and particularly undocu-
mented immigrants, halted or limited 
through stricter implementation of exist-
ing laws and better enforcement. Non-
restrictionists generally favor policies that 
maintain or increase immigration flows 
through appropriate legal channels, pro-
mote greater integration of immigrants in 
their new communities, and provide a path 
to legalization for the undocumented.
Faced with federal inaction and the chal-
lenges of a growing immigrant popula-
tion—particularly in localities with limited 
infrastructure to support the integration 
of new immigrants—an increasing num-
ber of cities and other local governments 
began pursuing their own policies to reg-
ulate immigration and address the pres-
ence of undocumented immigrants. In 
total, between 2005 and 2010, more than 
6,000 immigration-related bills were intro-
duced in the 50 state legislatures and more 
than 1,000 of those bills were enacted.3 Even 
where these bills were not passed, they have 
succeeded in creating a climate where immi-
grants and Latinos in general do not feel 
welcome. In certain cases, some have even 
chosen to relocate.4 Despite challenges in 
court, these bills have paved the way for 
other localities to follow similar paths.
For example, the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act, enacted in September 1996, included 
a provision that allows local law enforce-
ment authorities to gain delegated author-
ity for immigration enforcement within 
their jurisdictions. However, before 2002, 
The relationship of 
immigration and economic 
growth is essential at a time 
of high unemployment.
7Introduction
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT-RELATED LOCAL ORDINANCES
no city or state had signed memoran-
dums of agreement with U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to imple-
ment this program, known as 287(g). Today, 
there are 69 such 287(g) agreements with 
law enforcement agencies in 24 states.5
These new local policies have attracted 
the attention of local and national media. 
Both immigrants and native populations 
are being affected with reported increases 
in discrimination based on ethnicity and 
immigration status and a growing num-
ber of hate crimes against Latinos.6
The dissatisfaction across the ideological 
spectrum is reflected in the diversity of local 
immigration-related ordinances. Beginning 
in the mid-2000s, cities started to implement 
a wide variety of ordinances that can be cat-
egorized as either restrictive or non-restric-
tive. Restrictive policies aim to dissuade 
undocumented immigrants from settling 
in or moving to a locality, as a means of 
keeping jobs and services in the hands of 
citizens and legal residents. For example, 
a notoriously restrictive ordinance—the 
Immigration Relief Act of 2006 passed in 
Hazleton PA—allowed the city to revoke 
the licenses of businesses that hire undocu-
mented workers and revoke rental licenses 
from landlords who rented to persons with-
out valid documentation. The ordinance 
was immediately challenged on constitu-
tional grounds and remains suspended.7
On the other hand, non-restrictive 
ordinances often embrace sanctuary city 
policies that bar local law enforcement 
and city employees from investigating 
the legal status of residents. Cities like 
Chapel Hill NC, have worked to incorporate 
growing immigrant populations into their 
communities by facilitating access to certain 
public services. New York City—although 
not included in this analysis because the 
city enacted its non-restrictive ordinances 
(as measured in this white paper) prior to 
the 2006–2008 period—is another example 
of a city working to facilitate immigrant 
integration and to maximize the potential 
benefits. A number of immigration-related 
laws and executive orders have been enacted 
over the years: a prohibition for New York 
City officials to turn the names of local 
undocumented immigrants over to federal 
immigration officials (1998); a guarantee 
that all residents—regardless of legal 
status—have access to local social services 
(2003); and improvements to city services 
for non-English-speaking residents (2008).
Given the proliferation of local immi-
gration laws enacted in recent years, suffi-
cient data now exist to draw preliminary 
inferences about the economic conse-
quences of different immigration policies. 
While immigration is assuredly not a pri-
mary cause or solution to the economic 
downturn in the United States, immi-
gration ordinances can influence local 
employment levels and economic growth.
Recognizing that future debate on 
comprehensive immigration reform will 
certainly be influenced by discussions 
of policies already enacted across the 
country, this report intends to contribute 
to the debate by presenting some of the 
economic impacts of restrictive versus non-
restrictive immigrant-related ordinances. 
Economic impact can be measured by a 
number of variables, but in order to present 
consistent data that is available for each 
city included in this study, the economic 
outcomes this paper looks at are limited to 
the number of businesses and employees at 
the local level at passage of an immigrant-
related ordinance and in 2009. Here, a 
comparison is made between the economic 
impacts observed in restrictive versus non-
restrictive cities. The analysis shows that, 
on average, restrictive immigrant-related 
ordinances—those focused on employment, 
housing, 287(g), or English-only—have 
a negative impact on local economies in 
comparison to non-restrictive ordinances 
that implicitly or explicitly allow for 
access to public services and mandate law 
enforcement policies based on a “don’t 
ask don’t tell” policy (except for criminal 
cases). This impact is largely evidenced by 
the decrease in the number of employees 
citywide, and the corresponding number of 
jobs lost. But this overall conclusion is more 
nuanced when looking at the economic 
outcomes of individual types of ordinances.
Immigration ordinances 
can influence local 
employment levels and 
economic growth.
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T
here is small but growing schol-
arship examining local and state 
government policies toward 
immigrants.8 The literature sug-
gests a wide combination of fac-
tors that shape political responses and 
policies toward immigrants, such as 
demographic, political and ideological 
variables. In addition, the rise in legis-
lative activism at the city level could be 
partly explained as a response to over-
burdened local governments, well-pub-
licized and extremely polarized federal 
failures on immigration enforcement, and 
a sharp rise in anti-immigrant rhetoric in 
the media. This creates a perfect storm 
for the enactment of local ordinances.9
Although municipalities have adopted 
a variety of ordinances to overcome chal-
lenges associated with large-scale immigra-
tion, it is problematic to claim definitively 
whether restrictive or non-restrictive ordi-
nances are better than the other. The 
utility of an ordinance is largely deter-
mined by its intended goal. If city lead-
ers wish to reduce the local population 
of immigrants (especially those unau-
thorized), discourage future settlement 
or create a more inward-focused econ-
omy, then a restrictive ordinance that tar-
gets these goals can likely help to yield 
such results. But if a city or state is seeking 
to expand employment opportunities for 
all, maintain the economy’s competitive-
ness—relative to other U.S. cities and glob-
ally—and provide the basis for economic 
growth, then non-restrictionist policies 
will likely be the more effective approach.
Budgetary and fiscal concerns are  
also cited as reasons to support either 
restrictive or non-restrictive immigrant-
related ordinances.
Legal questions about the constitution-
ality of such acts are entangled in this 
debate. This issue also raises questions 
regarding national identity, the value of 
racial, ethnic and linguistic diversity, and 
concerns about potential discrimina-
tion. These questions, while important, are 
beyond the scope of this research. Instead, 
the focus here is exclusively on economic 
issues. All communities are presumably 
in agreement: it is better to acheive more 
economic growth and more job creation 
for everyone. That is why economic out-
comes are the critical variables to look 
at in cities that have embraced different 
approaches to undocumented immigration.
There are several competing theories 
regarding the local economic impact of 
immigrants. On one hand, it is argued that 
undocumented immigrants have deleterious 
effects on the labor market, driving down 
wages and increasing unemployment,10 
Restrictive vs. Non-
Restrictive Ordinances: 
Competing Arguments  
Budgetary and fiscal 
concerns are cited as 
reasons to support 
either restrictive or non-
restrictive immigrant-
related ordinances.
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particularly among native-born minori-
ties and groups with high poverty rates.11 
George Borjas finds that the 1980–2000 
influx of immigrants reduced the wages 
of lower-educated, native male workers by 
3.6 percent in the long run.12 From this per-
spective, it makes economic sense for local 
governments to restrict undocumented 
immigration, especially during a period of 
economic stress and high unemployment.
In contrast, those in favor of non-restric-
tive immigration policies frequently con-
tend that undocumented immigrants 
perform work that native-born Americans 
will not do, even if wages were substan-
tially higher. Thus, restrictions that target 
the undocumented population—with the 
corresponding indirect effects on autho-
rized immigrants—may result in labor 
shortages and higher prices, but not higher 
wages or higher employment. From this 
standpoint, immigration restrictions rep-
resent an economic inefficiency, since the 
most suitable workers are denied access 
to jobs. This inefficiency should presum-
ably have a detrimental effect on the econ-
omy, resulting in lower levels of growth 
and stifling an already shaky economic 
recovery. In Georgia, the Fruit and Vegeta-
ble Growers’ Association estimated in June 
2011 that HB 87 (a restrictive law) is likely 
to drive away workers and could result in 
a $300 million loss for the industry.13
To put it simply, the debate is focused 
around two central issues. The first relates 
to the number of immigrants residing in 
a city. The second is concerned with the 
impact on public expenditures and rev-
enues and the local economy in general. 
The results, especially those related to 
immigrants’ fiscal and economic contri-
butions, are mixed and colored by meth-
odological, legal and conceptual issues 
that go beyond the scope of this report.14
Others have previously considered 
the economic effects of restrictive ordi-
nances. In a 2010 Cardozo Law Review 
article,15 Huyen Pham and Van H. Pham 
examined the economic impact of restric-
tive county-level immigration ordinances 
on high-immigrant industries, finding 
that such ordinances led to a 1 to 2 per-
cent decrease in local employment rates. 
For academic consistency, this analysis 
uses a similar data set but looks across all 
industries and includes only cities—a lower 
level of geographic aggregation where the 
effects of these policies will be felt more 
readily—that implemented non-restric-
tive ordinances between 2006 and 2008. In 
doing so, this white paper provides a com-
parative analysis of the economic effects.
All communities are 
presumably in agreement: 
it is better to acheive 
more economic growth 
and more job creation. 
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T
his analysis is based on data from 
53 cities that enacted immigrant-
related ordinances between Jan-
uary 2006 and December 2008.16 
The study used a consistent, reli-
able source for gathering and measur-
ing local economic data as it relates to 
job creation and business growth. Addi-
tional sources of data for measuring eco-
nomic impact—namely city revenue 
and new home permits, among others—
were considered, but data were not read-
ily available across all communities.
Of the cities analyzed, 13 are classified as 
non-restrictive sanctuary cities that passed 
official ordinances preventing local police 
and city employees from inquiring about 
the immigration status of local residents, 
unless required to do so under state or fed-
eral laws or court decisions.17 Restrictive 
ordinances, enforced by 40 cities included 
in this report, varied in scope and signifi-
cance, and not all targeted undocumented 
immigrants specifically. While some cities 
enacted more punitive policies, others pur-
sued less comprehensive strategies, such as 
the adoption of English-only ordinances, 
which promote English as the only official 
language. Other cities officially established 
policies restricting undocumented immi-
grants from accessing local social services.
A large number of local ordinances regard-
ing immigration, particularly restrictive 
ordinances, have been suspended by court 
rulings. Cities that passed restrictionist ordi-
nances intended to curtail renting to undoc-
umented immigrants, such as in Farmers 
Branch, Texas, and in Riverside, New Jer-
sey, immediately encountered legal chal-
lenges. Faced with legal obstacles regarding 
permissible ordinances, cities have experi-
mented with other methods of discourag-
ing the settlement of immigrants in their 
communities. At present, 287(g) agreements 
and the mandatory use of the Employ-
ment Eligibility Verification Program, or 
E-Verify—a nationwide system to verify 
the legal status of hired employees—for 
county and city contractors are two of the 
more common types of restrictionist mea-
sures implemented by local governments.
Methodology
The objective of the data analysis is to study the impact of immigrant-related ordinances—both restrictive and non-
restrictive—on the business environment 
(defined as the number of both businesses 
and of full-time employees) in cities that 
passed and implemented such ordinances 
in the 2006–2008 period. It is at the city 
level—rather than at the state or national 
level—where the policy implications of such 
ordinances are going to be felt most acutely. 
The 2006–2008 time frame was selected 
to allow for an analysis of a city’s business 
environment across a period of years and 
across cities. For that reason, the study looks 
at the number of businesses and employ-
ees and how these might be affected by the 
passage of an immigrant-related ordinance. 
There, we compare the resulting economic 
outcomes in 2009 in cities that passed 
restrictive versus non-restrictive legislation.
Our study found that the impact of restric-
tive laws on business was mixed. After con-
trolling for city-level variables (population, 
household growth, median home values, 
median household income, cities’ house-
hold income ranking, income per capita, a 
year indicator and the number of employ-
ees or businesses, for each model, respec-
tively), the results indicate that restrictive 
ordinances negatively affect the num-
ber of jobs in a particular city but do not 
significantly affect the aggregate num-
ber of businesses.18 This impact seems to 
be driven by certain types of ordinances, 
especially those related to employment.
This report—providing continuity 
Data Analysis  
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from the Pham and Pham (2010) study—
is limited to analyzing the four most 
commonly passed restrictive local policies: 
employment-related ordinances requiring 
proof of legal status to gain employment; 
English-only ordinances; housing 
ordinances that limit the maximum 
occupancy for an apartment or single-family 
home or that require landlords to record 
personal tenant information to be available 
to public authorities; and law enforcement 
ordinances authorizing local police to 
enforce federal immigration laws under a 
memorandum of agreement between local 
law enforcement agencies and ICE. However, 
unlike the Pham and Pham study, non-
restrictive ordinances are included in this 
data set to look at the comparative effect of 
such policies. (See figure 1 for the numerical 
breakdown of those analyzed.) Other 
ordinances such as those related to health, 
education and other public benefits and 
services are not considered here since cities 
do not have full control over such benefits.
Employment ordinances
This is perhaps the most heterogeneous 
category of immigration-related law, 
as well as the type of ordinance most 
commonly enacted from 2006 to 2008. 
Ordinances in this category are intended 
to discourage local employers from hiring 
undocumented workers. Some ordinances 
require that only employers who receive 
city contracts verify the legality of their 
employees, whereas others require that 
all employers within city limits hire only 
legal workers. These ordinances also vary 
in terms of enforcement, as some mandate 
that employers actually demonstrate 
that their workers are legal and others 
just make employers sign an affidavit 
promising not to hire undocumented 
workers. In recent years, municipalities 
have increasingly made it mandatory 
for local employers to use E-Verify—an 
online service that allows businesses to 
determine the legal status of their workers.
English-only ordinances
While not related to immigration per 
se, these ordinances may affect residents 
regardless of their migratory situation, 
and make their lives more difficult. These 
laws serve as a symbol of resistance to the 
cultural and linguistic changes associated 
with immigration. Ordinances within 
this category either declare English as the 
locality’s official language or mandate 
that city services be provided exclusively 
in English. While such ordinances may be 
enacted with undocumented immigrants 
in mind, citizens and other legal residents 
who may not speak English fluently 
also bear the brunt of such policies.
Housing ordinances
Ordinances in this category attempt to 
restrict undocumented immigrants from 
renting a house or apartment within a 
community. Such ordinances typically 
require landlords to collect and main-
tain immigration documentation for all 
tenants. Cities have also experimented 
with policies mandating that all tenants 
acquire rental licenses from the local gov-
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ernment, which would require appli-
cants to demonstrate their legal status.
287(g) memorandum of agreement
The 287(g) program allows local and state 
law enforcement to enter into a partner-
ship with ICE under a memorandum of 
agreement. Law enforcement entities that 
are part of the 287(g) program receive train-
ing from ICE officers, and subsequently 
possess the authority to identify, process 
and detain undocumented immigrants.
Non-Restrictive cities
More commonly known as sanctuary cities, 
non-restrictive localities pass an ordinance 
that typically bars local law enforcement 
and other government officials from inquir-
ing about the immigration status of local 
residents or ban the use of local govern-
ment resources in enforcing federal immi-
gration law. A large number of U.S. cities 
are de facto sanctuary cities; however, this 
analysis only includes those municipal-
ities that formally passed such an ordi-
nance within the period of analysis.
Geographically, the diversity of cities 
in which immigrant-related ordinances 
were enacted during the period of anal-
ysis is remarkable. The sample included 
in this white paper encompasses cities in 
states with the highest and lowest Human 
Development Index (HDI)—a summary 
measure of well-being and opportunity 
ranging from 0 to 10—in terms of educa-
tional attainment, school enrollment, life 
expectancy at birth, and median earn-
ings for the population 16 years of age and 
older.19 For instance, the average HDI in 
states with cities that enacted non-restric-
tive ordinances is around 5.62; in contrast, 
the HDI for restrictive immigrant-related 
ordinances is around 4.83—about 1.2 times 
lower.20 Connecticut has the highest HDI 
(6.3) in the sample, and Arkansas has the 
lowest (3.9). This means that cities in states 
with high and low well-being, as mea-
sured by the HDI, passed both restrictive 
and non-restrictive ordinances, indicating 
a weak relationship between a state’s over-
all development and cities’ actions—both 
welcoming or not—toward immigrants.
City Selection
In contrast to state-level immigration-
related legislation, there is no city-spe-
cific database that provides a complete and 
authoritative state of affairs on the pas-
sage of local immigration ordinances. That 
is why our database was initially compiled 
with publicly available data from immigra-
tion-concerned organizations across the 
ideological spectrum: American Civil Lib-
erties Union, Fair Immigration Reform 
Movement, Puerto Rican Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, the National Immi-
gration Law Center, and U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), among 
others. (For a complete list of sources, see 
www.as-coa.org/ordinance_data.) After 
combining this data, an additional search 
was conducted of cities that had enacted 
ordinances that were not revoked in the 
2006–2008 period.21 Information on each 
ordinance and its policy realm was then 
recorded and entered into our database.22
Table 1 shows that 13 cities enacted non-
restrictive immigrant-related ordinances in 
nine states, while 40 cities passed restrictive 
immigrant-related ordinances in 18 differ-
ent states. Together, cities that passed either 
restrictive or non-restrictive ordinances rep-
resent less than 1 percent of the more than 
25,000 municipalities in the United States.
The economic data come from the Esri  
Community Sourcebook America 2006–2009 
editions, which provide detailed demo-
graphic and business data for every U.S. zip 
code. The analysis uses data on the number 
of businesses and the number of employ-
ees as proxies measuring the economic/
business environment in a particular city 
for a specific year. The total number of com-
panies and employees was aggregated at 
the city level based on geographic iden-
tifiers and merged to Esri’s demographic 
database. Still, limitations exist with Esri 
data as it does not account for some immi-
grants, especially those undocumented, 
who may be working for cash and therefore 
are not reported as employees for tax pur-
poses. Nonetheless, a metadata study con-
Results indicate that 
restrictive ordinances 
negatively affect the 
number of jobs in 
a particular city. 
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TABLE 1. Immigrant-Related Ordinances, by City and Type (2006–2008)
CITY STATE ORDINANCE YEAR PASSED TYPE
Oakland CA Non-Restrictive 2007 Sanctuary
Santa Cruz CA Non-Restrictive 2007 Sanctuary
Watsonville CA Non-Restrictive 2007 Sanctuary
Hartford CT Non-Restrictive 2008 Sanctuary
New Haven CT Non-Restrictive 2007 Sanctuary
Chicago IL Non-Restrictive 2006 Sanctuary
Chelsea MA Non-Restrictive 2007 Sanctuary
Detroit MI Non-Restrictive 2007 Sanctuary
Carrboro NC Non-Restrictive 2006 Sanctuary
Chapel Hill NC Non-Restrictive 2007 Sanctuary
Newark NJ Non-Restrictive 2006 Sanctuary
Alexandria VA Non-Restrictive 2006 Sanctuary
Middlebury VT Non-Restrictive 2007 Sanctuary
Athens AL Restrictive 2007 Employment
Gadsden AL Restrictive 2006 English-only
Rogers AR Restrictive 2007 287(g)
Springdale AR Restrictive 2007 287(g)
Lake Havasu City AZ Restrictive 2007 Employment
Payson AZ Restrictive 2007 Employment
Phoenix AZ Restrictive 2008 287(g)
Apple Valley CA Restrictive 2006 Employment
Lancaster CA Restrictive 2007 Employment
Mission Viejo CA Restrictive 2007 Employment
Santa Clarita CA Restrictive 2006 Employment
Vista CA Restrictive 2007 Employment
Cape Coral FL Restrictive 2006 Employment
Barnstable Town MA Restrictive 2006 Housing
Taneytown MD Restrictive 2006 English-only
Hazel Park MI Restrictive 2006 English-only
Valley Park MO Restrictive 2007 Employment
Durham NC Restrictive 2008 287(g)
Landis NC Restrictive 2006 English-only
Southern Shores NC Restrictive 2008 English-only
Las Vegas NV Restrictive 2008 287(g)
Bellaire OH Restrictive 2007 Employment
Sycamore Township OH Restrictive 2007 Employment
Inola OK Restrictive 2006 Employment
Oologah OK Restrictive 2006 Employment
Tulsa OK Restrictive 2006 Employment
Altoona PA Restrictive 2006 Employment
Berwick PA Restrictive 2007 Housing
Bridgeport PA Restrictive 2006 Housing
Gilberton PA Restrictive 2006 Employment
Mahanoy City PA Restrictive 2006 Employment
Shenandoah PA Restrictive 2006 English-only
Beaufort SC Restrictive 2006 Employment
Gaston SC Restrictive 2006 Employment
Carrollton TX Restrictive 2008 287(g)
Farmers Branch TX Restrictive 2008 287(g)
Herndon VA Restrictive 2007 287(g)
Manassas VA Restrictive 2008 287(g)
Manassas Park VA Restrictive 2008 287(g)
Green Bay WI Restrictive 2007 Employment
Data Analysis
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FIGURE 2. Number of Businesses and Employees 
for Selected Cities (2006–2009)
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ducted by the Congressional Budget Office 
published in 2007 shows that around 50 
to 75 percent of undocumented migrants 
pay federal, state and local taxes, indicat-
ing that these numbers would be counted 
as employees in Esri’s database.23 Even 
with this limitation, Esri data is the best 
data source since the company uses the 
same sources and methodologies over 
time, thereby increasing data reliability.
The number of businesses and employ-
ees was selected for several reasons. First, 
sample city data for other indicators such 
as city revenues was either too difficult 
to obtain or incomplete. Second, cities 
vary widely in the types of taxes and rev-
enues collected and how information is 
reported. For instance, some cities may 
report revenue originated from municipal 
bond offerings and others may report state 
transfers within the larger category of rev-
enue. Third, given the size of select sam-
ple cities, some types of data may not be 
publicly available. Fourth, data related to 
other indicators such as new home per-
mits may not be very reliable and consis-
tent across time. This would have made it 
difficult to compare that data across cit-
ies. For these and a number of other factors, 
Esri’s database provides a significant advan-
tage in terms of its comparability across 
cities and time, which increases the reliabil-
ity and validity of this report’s findings.24
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the two 
dependent, or outcome, variables—number 
of businesses and number of employees—
in two cities. Payson AZ, and Middlebury 
VT, were deliberately chosen for this illus-
trative example because of their compara-
bility in terms of the number businesses 
and employees within the period of analy-
sis. The solid line illustrates how the num-
ber of businesses (top graph for each city) 
and the number of employees (bottom 
graph) changed between 2006 and 2009. 
The dashed line shows the year in which 
the ordinance was passed. In this example, 
there is variation in the impact of restric-
tive and non-restrictive immigrant-related 
ordinances. For instance, after the passage 
of a restrictive employment ordinance, the 
number of businesses in Payson decreased 
by 16; in Middlebury, the number of busi-
nesses increased by 29 after the non-restric-
tive ordinance went into effect. In contrast, 
the number of employees both for Payson 
and for Middlebury increased by around 
400 employees a year after ordinance pas-
sage. But in Payson, job creation remained 
stagnant after 2008, while this indica-
tor continued increasing in Middlebury.
This example shows the potential for 
variation in the economic activity—as 
measured in this white paper—of each 
city during our period of analysis. This 
variability is not just exclusive to these 
two cities. For instance, in other cities 
such as Athens AL, Lancaster CA, and 
Valley Park MO, the number of businesses 
increased after the passage of restrictive 
employment ordinances. But in Athens, 
the number of employees decreased. In 
Vista CA, and Bellaire OH, which also 
passed such ordinances, the number of 
businesses decreased in both cities while 
the number of employees decreased only 
in Bellaire. These results illustrate the 
variation and distinct impacts that the 
implementation of restrictive versus non-
restrictive immigration ordinances may 
have on the business environment. But it 
would be very difficult to discern a clear 
relationship without performing the 
statistical analysis in this white paper.
Given the differences that exist between 
cities in terms of size and geographic 
location, as well as the differences in terms 
of cities’ exposure to external shocks during 
the period of analysis, it is necessary to 
include in the statistical analysis a wide 
number of factors to control for such 
disparities between cities. We included 
those available for all cities in the database: 
population, household growth, median 
home values, median household income, 
inter-city ranking, and per capita income.25 
Including these variables in the statistical 
model allows for the averaging out of some 
of the most important structural differences 
between cities, which are intimately related 
to each city’s business environment. 
This increases the ability to better 
The analysis studies the 
impact on the business 
environment—defined as 
the number of businesses 
and full-time employees.
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isolate the effects of implementing 
immigrant-related ordinances—whether 
restrictive or non-restrictive—on the 
business environment in a particular city. 
The inclusion of relevant independent 
variables provides further assurance 
that any apparent relationship between 
immigration-related ordinances and a city’s 
business environment is not spurious.
To account for these differences and 
to investigate the impact of immigrant-
related ordinances on cities’ business 
environments, a series of log-linear 
multilevel regression models were 
developed to test the overall impact of 
restrictive versus non-restrictive immigrant-
related ordinances and the specific 
impact of different types of ordinances 
on a city’s business environment.26
In addition to controlling for some of the 
structural differences that exist between 
cities in terms of population and income, 
a year indicator was included to capture 
any temporal shocks that could impact 
the number of businesses or employees.
The model also incorporates a city-level 
effect, which picks up variation across 
cities not accounted for in the variables 
previously described. For example, cities 
may have been affected differently by the 
financial crisis and the housing meltdown, 
making the business environments more 
or less predisposed to see a creation or 
disappearance of businesses and jobs. 
Different states also may have their own 
economic development policies, which, 
in turn, will result in unique impacts on 
their cities’ business environments.
The results of these statistical models 
allow for measuring the proportionate 
change in the expected number of 
businesses and/or employees as a 
comparison of cities with restrictive and 
non-restrictive ordinances while taking 
into account the differences that exist 
between them. In other words, the results 
should be interpreted as the expected 
change in the number of businesses or 
employees (depending on the model) 
due to the implementation of restrictive 
immigrant-related ordinances or to non-
restrictive immigrant-related ordinances.
Any apparent relationship 
between immigration-
related ordinances and a 
city’s business environment 
is not spurious. 
17THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT-RELATED LOCAL ORDINANCES
O
verall, the results paint a mixed 
picture of the impact of restrictive 
immigrant-related ordinances on 
cities’ business environments. (See 
Appendix for regression tables.) 
We found no effect on the number of busi-
nesses, but did discover an effect on the 
reduction in the number of employees.
After controlling for several structural dif-
ferences between cities—including popu-
lation, household growth, median house 
value, median household income, income 
per capita, income ranking between cit-
ies, and time effects—the impact of restric-
tive ordinances on the number of businesses 
does not seem to be significant. This 
means that no difference was observed 
between the number of businesses in cit-
ies that passed restrictive ordinances and 
those that passed non-restrictive ones. 
Testing the impact of restrictive versus 
non-restrictive ordinances on the num-
ber of employees—the second measure of 
a city’s business environment—provides a 
different result. Once again, after control-
ling for the same structural differences 
that exist between cities, restrictive ordi-
nances appear to have a negative impact 
on the expected number of employees. An 
average city with a restrictive ordinance 
has 0.18 times fewer expected number of 
employees than its non-restrictive counter-
part. This effect, even if it is not significant 
at a 95 percent confidence interval, is signif-
icant at 90 percent confidence. This means 
that a 10 percent probability exists that the 
results seen are due to chance rather than 
the statistical modeling. For example, if the 
expected number of workers in an average 
city that enacted a non-restrictive ordinance 
is 100, the model and data predict that the 
number of employees would be 0.18 times 
lower (82 employees total) in a city with a 
restrictive immigrant-related ordinance.
However, by classifying all ordinances 
into restrictive and non-restrictive group-
ings, the results may be missing an impor-
tant variance between each type of 
ordinance and its impact on the business 
environment. That is why the next set of 
results looks at this potential relationship 
through regression analyses that examine 
the number of businesses and employees for 
each specific type of ordinance while again 
controlling for city-by-city structural differ-
ences as explained in the previous section.
Due to their particular policy domain, not 
all ordinances are going to have a uniform 
and systematic impact on a city’s business 
environment. For instance, English-only 
ordinances will have the greatest impact on 
those who are not English speakers, limit-
ing their ability to access certain city ser-
vices. But these ordinances will not likely 
have as significant an impact on the busi-
ness environment as ordinances affecting 
business activity within a city’s jurisdiction. 
Housing and occupancy laws are likely to 
have a more targeted impact, especially for 
tenants and landlords. Imposing additional 
regulatory requirements on residents may 
generate additional costs to landlords and 
Results: 
The Economic Effects 
The number of employees 
in a city with a restrictive 
immigration-related 
ordinance would be 0.18 
times lower than in a 
non-restrictive one.
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tenants who may or may not be able to cover 
any associated rent increases. The 287(g) pro-
gram is unlikely to have a significant, mea-
surable impact (although the indirect effects 
on society are not measured here) unless, as 
in the cases of Arizona and Alabama, addi-
tional restrictionist provisions are included.
To analyze how ordinances affect each of 
the economic outcome variables, a multilevel 
regression to the log number of businesses 
on the type of ordinance is conducted. (See 
table 3 in the Appendix). The impact of the 
different types of ordinances on the number 
of businesses after only controlling for year 
effects is significant; but after controlling 
for cities’ structural differences the results 
suggest that specific ordinances do not have 
a significant effect on the number of busi-
nesses. This illustrates the importance of 
including these variables to average out some 
of the structural differences between cities. 
When conducting a multilevel regression 
of the log number of employees on the type 
of ordinance—after controlling for popu-
lation, household growth, median home 
values, income per capita, median house-
hold income, city income ranking and 
time effects—the results indicate that only 
employment-related ordinances had a nega-
tive and statistically significant impact on 
cities’ business environments when com-
paring with cities that had non-restrictive 
ordinances, and that effect was only on 
the number of employees. On average, the 
expected number of employees in a city 
with a restrictive employment-related ordi-
nance would be approximately 0.26 times 
lower than the number in a city that enacted 
a non-restrictive ordinance. For instance, 
if the number of employees in a city that 
enacted a non-restrictive ordinance was 
10,000, the model predicts, on average, an 
observation of 2,600 fewer jobs in a city 
that enacted an employment-restrictive 
ordinance. (See table 4 in the Appendix). 
 
Understanding the Results
The preceding regression models show that restrictive ordinances have a nega-tive impact on the number of employ-
ees in a city, but not on the number of 
businesses. This does not definitively dem-
onstrate that restrictive immigration ordi-
nances do not ultimately lead to business 
closure. Rather, the results may be a func-
tion of the lag between an ordinance’s pas-
sage and its full economic impact. There 
are two means by which restrictionist ordi-
nances could lead to businesses eventually 
closing their doors: the long-term reduction 
in business productivity and the decline in 
worker consumption in the local economy.
To make predictions regarding the eco-
nomic impact of an immigration-related 
ordinance, it is important to account for 
the local economic context. Both the size 
of the local immigrant workforce and the 
types of industries operating within a com-
munity must be kept in mind, as some com-
munities are more dependent on immigrant 
labor than others. Previous research sug-
gests that industries in which immigrant 
labor is overrepresented are more likely to 
experience negative employment effects as 
a result of restrictive ordinances.27 Increas-
ing employment-related enforcement would 
likely increase the opportunity costs for 
immigrants (mainly those without documen-
tation) to stay in a particular city, and their 
exodus would assuredly harm local busi-
nesses dependent on immigrant workers. 
Any negative effects of immigration on 
the local wages will certainly be most evi-
dent at the lower rungs of the educational 
ladder. However, these effects will be rela-
tively small when we consider that immi-
grant and native-born laborers tend to 
complement each other, rather than com-
pete. That is, in communities with a large 
foreign-born population, immigrants tend 
to specialize in manual-labor occupations. 
We might infer that these immigrant labor-
ers are squeezing less educated native-born 
workers out of the labor market entirely. 
However, research indicates that native-
born workers respond to this potential chal-
lenge by specializing in industries in which 
they have a comparative advantage, namely, 
When compared to cities 
with non-restrictive 
ordinances, employment-
related ones had a 
negative and statistically 
significant impact on cities’ 
business environments. 
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those that require communication and 
language skills.28 Jobs in these industries 
tend to provide higher wages than manual 
labor; thus, immigrant workers who work 
in lower-wage jobs can actually boost the 
incomes of many less-educated native work-
ers and increase a community’s aggregate 
productivity. Related research indicates that 
immigration only reduced the average real 
wages of less educated U.S.-born workers 
by 0.3 percent between 1990 and 2000; how-
ever, without task specialization this loss 
would have oscillated around 1.2 percent.29 
While one might plausibly infer that 
select immigrant laborers are driving out 
native-born workers, if that were occur-
ring we would expect native-born Ameri-
cans to exit communities that draw large 
numbers of immigrants. That does not 
appear to be happening. A study examin-
ing the native response to immigrant popu-
lation growth across cities found that cities 
experiencing rapid growth due to immigra-
tion did not show a corresponding decline 
in the native population.30 In fact, many of 
the cities with the most rapidly-growing 
immigrant populations are also attracting 
large numbers of native-born Americans.
A plausible explanation of this pat-
tern is that immigrant labor not only per-
forms certain jobs that otherwise would 
be hard to fill but, more importantly, can 
create positive externalities for lower-edu-
cated native-born workers. By encouraging 
these U.S.-born workers to enter indus-
tries in which they clearly have a competi-
tive advantage, immigrant labor supports 
more profitable, skilled and desirable jobs 
for native-born workers within communi-
ties.31 The increased wages these jobs pro-
vide are good for both the workers and the 
local economy, as their increased wages 
result in a higher level of consumption.
The fact that the effect of restrictive ordi-
nances may be felt more in industries that 
traditionally employ larger numbers of 
immigrants does not necessarily imply that 
other members of society will not feel any 
deleterious effects. For instance, would the 
use of E-Verify lead to wage increases in jobs 
that undocumented migrants are forced 
to vacate? Recent experiences in the state 
of Georgia suggest that wage increases for 
farm workers did not become an immedi-
ate reality; instead, a shortage of farm labor 
proved to be the only immediate economic 
impact of that state’s restrictive legislation.32 
Do ordinances—beyond those focusing 
on employment—have any impact on a 
city’s business environment? The lack of 
statistical significance of the other types 
of ordinances—housing, English-only and 
287(g)—on a city’s business environment 
does not necessarily mean that these 
ordinances will not have any real impacts, 
both economic or non-economic, on a 
community as a whole. Such ordinances 
have political, social and even cultural 
effects and unintended consequences—
such as profiling and targeting of other 
members of society—with the implications 
felt by the native-born and legally resident 
Latino populations. In September 2011, a 
federal judge’s upholding of Alabama’s HB 
56 immigration law—which allows state 
and local police to ask for immigration 
papers during routine traffic stops, makes 
most contracts with undocumented 
immigrants unenforceable, and requires 
schools to verify pupils’ immigration status 
at registration time—will likely have an 
important impact on those communities 
that relied on immigrant labor. In the 
short run at the very least, farmers, 
contractors and home builders will likely 
experience a shortage in the supply of 
labor, which could lead to job losses for 
the supervisors and managers as well.  
Gauging the economic impact of 
immigration-related ordinances requires 
a dynamic approach that incorporates 
immediate expenses and long-term 
revenues and is an area for further study. 
Methodologically, approaches such as those 
provided by propensity score matching 
may be an alternative approach for future 
research. It will also be useful to revisit 
these findings in coming years, as the 
long-term impacts of immigration-related 
ordinances become more apparent. 
By encouraging U.S.-born 
workers to enter industries 
where they have a competitive 
advantage, immigrant labor 
supports more profitable 
and desirable jobs for them. 
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trol variables, namely a year indicator, pop-
ulation growth, household growth, median 
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TABLE 1. Multilevel Regression with Varying Intercepts for Log Number 
of Businesses Given Immigrant-Related Restrictive Ordinances
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 log
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~)
Restrictive 
Ordinance 
-1.059 
(-1.77)
-1.059 
(-1.77)
0.0879 
(1.12)
0.0638 
(0.60)
0.0721 
(0.70)
0.0528 
(0.50)
0.0546 
(0.52)
0.0500
(0.47)
Year 0.0129*** 
(4.07)
-0.0176*** 
(-4.01)
-0.00646 
(-1.89)
-0.00597 
(-1.60)
-0.00660 
(-1.73)
-0.00500
(-0.70) 
-0.00395
(-0.55)
log 
(Employees) 
0.840*** 
(53.46)
0.429*** 
(10.26)
0.441*** 
(10.61)
0.442*** 
(10.67)
0.446*** 
(10.76)
0.442***
(10.66)
log 
(Population) 
0.459*** 
(9.59)
0.445*** 
(9.31)
0.439*** 
(9.22)
0.436***
(9.18)
 0.439***
(9.21)
HH Growth -0.0283**
(-2.68)
-0.0280** 
(-2.62)
-0.0278**
(-2.60) 
-0.0274* 
(-2.56)
-0.0266*
(-2.46)
log (Median 
Home Value) 
0.0177 
(0.54)
0.0106 
(0.31)
0.0131 
(0.37)
0.00567
(0.15)
HH Income 
Ranking 
0.00117  
(0.71)
0.00209 
(0.57)
0.00234
(0.64)
log (Median 
HH Income) 
-0.0857 
(-0.28)
-0.201
(-0.58)
log (Income 
PC)
0.141
(0.69)
Constant 8.155*** 
(16.00)
8.136*** 
(15.97)
-0.711*** 
(-4.00)
-1.501***
(-5.52) 
-1.689*** 
(-3.77)
-1.608*** 
(-3.48)
-0.766 
(-0.25)
-0.863
(-0.29)
lns1_1_1 
Constant 
0.608*** 
(5.96)
0.608*** 
(5.96)
-1.465*** 
(-13.01)
-1.165*** 
(-6.63)
-1.192*** 
(-6.41)
-1.202*** 
(-6.55)
-1.213***
(-6.40) 
-1.205***
(-6.37)
Insig_e 
Constant 
-2.958***
(-50.19) 
-3.012*** 
(-51.12)
-2.700***
(-44.60) 
-3.008*** 
(-39.86)
-3.000*** 
(-38.41)
-2.999*** 
(-38.73)
-2.996*** 
(-37.92)
-3.000***
(-38.01)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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TABLE 2. Multilevel Regression with Varying Intercepts for Log Number 
of Employees Given Immigrant-Related Restrictive Ordinances
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 log 
(Employ~) 
log 
(Employ~) 
log 
(Employ~) 
log 
(Employ~)
log 
(Employ~) 
log 
(Employ~) 
log 
(Employ~)
 log 
(Employ~)
Restrictive 
Ordinance
-1.365* 
(-2.00)
-1.365*
(-2.00)
-0.182*
(-2.10)
-0.162
(-1.79)
-0.182*
(-2.00)
-0.182
(-1.89)
-0.181
(-1.88)
-0.179
(-1.85)
Year 0.0363*** 
(7.52)
0.0219***
(4.31)
0.0216*** 
(4.31)
0.0191*** 
(3.56)
0.0191*** 
(3.43)
0.0200* 
(2.19)
0.0196*
(2.12)
log 
(Businesses) 
1.117***
(55.68) 
1.022*** 
(17.21)
1.028*** 
(17.50)
1.028*** 
(17.44)
1.026***
(17.44) 
1.027***
(17.28)
log 
(Population) 
0.0959 
(1.70)
0.0978 
(1.75)
0.0978 
(1.75)
0.0991
(1.76)
0.0993
(1.77)
HH Growth -0.0193 
(-1.33)
-0.0155
(-1.06 
-0.0156 
(-1.05)
-0.0157 
(-1.06)
-0.0166
(-1.10)
log (Median 
Home Value) 
-0.0547 
(-1.27)
-0.0550 
(-1.13)
-0.0536 
(-1.08)
-0.0502
(-0.99)
HH Income 
Ranking 
0.0000191 
(0.01)
0.000523 
(0.12)
0.000448
(0.10)
log (Median 
HH Income) 
-0.0460 
(-0.12)
0.0121
(0.03)
log (Income 
PC)
-0.0797
(-0.34)
Constant 10.59*** 
(18.20)
10.53*** 
(18.11)
1.442***
(8.08)
 1.158***
(4.52)
 1.767** 
(3.28)
1.770** 
(3.00)
2.217
(0.61) 
2.351
(0.64)
lns1_1_1 
Constant 
0.740***
(7.25) 
0.740*** 
(7.25)
-1.365*** 
(-12.90)
-1.326*** 
(-11.41)
-1.341*** 
(-11.48)
-1.340*** 
(-11.47)
-1.338*** 
(-11.30)
-1.338***
(-11.30)
Insig_e 
Constant 
-2.427*** 
(-41.19)
-2.593*** 
(-44.00)
-2.545*** 
(-43.02)
-2.570*** 
(-41.95)
-2.570*** 
(-41.90)
-2.570*** 
(-41.89)
-2.571*** 
(-41.68)
-2.571***
(-41.69)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
24
Appendix: Regression Tables 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT-RELATED LOCAL ORDINANCES
TABLE 3. Multilevel Regression with Varying Intercepts for Log 
Number of Businesses Given Type of Immigrant-Related Restrictive 
Ordinances Using Non-Restrictive Ordinances as Baseline
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~) 
log 
(Busine~)
2. Employment -1.334* 
(-2.26)
-1.334*
(-2.26) 
0.161 
(1.92)
0.0932 
(0.80)
0.103 
(0.91)
0.0934 
(0.83)
0.0971 
(0.88)
0.0909
(0.81)
3. Housing -2.043 
(-1.62)
-2.043 
(-1.62)
0.123 
(0.71)
0.120 
(0.50)
0.126 
(0.54)
0.125 
(0.55)
0.128 
(0.57)
0.117
(0.52)
4. English  -2.158* 
(-2.48)
-2.158*
(-2.48) 
0.0377 
(0.31)
-0.114 
(-0.67)
-0.0974 
(-0.58)
-0.0943 
(-0.58)
-0.0935 
(-0.58)
-0.100
(-0.62)
5. 287(g) 0.561 
(0.75)
0.561 
(0.75)
-0.000905 
(-0.01)
0.0740 
(0.53)
0.0749 
(0.55)
0.0355 
(0.25)
0.0381 
(0.27)
0.0388
(0.27)
Year 0.0129*** 
(4.07)
-0.0180***
(-4.07)
 -0.00651
(-1.90)
 -0.00612 
(-1.64)
-0.00692 
(-1.80)
-0.00450 
(-0.63)
-0.00351
(-0.48)
log 
(Employees) 
0.852*** 
(51.01)
0.431*** 
(10.18)
0.443***
(10.52)
 0.453*** 
(10.85)
0.460***
(11.04)
0.453***
(10.84)
log 
(Population) 
0.454*** 
(9.59)
0.440*** 
(9.32)
0.429***
(9.16)
 0.422*** 
(9.08)
0.427***
(9.14)
HH Growth -0.0283**
(-2.68)
 -0.0279** 
(-2.60)
-0.0268*
(-2.50)
 -0.0262* 
(-2.43)
-0.0257*
(-2.36)
log (Median 
Home Value) 
0.0159
(0.48)
 0.00981
(0.28) 
0.0137 
(0.38)
0.00684
(0.19)
HH Income 
Ranking 
0.00112
(0.66)
 0.00254 
(0.70)
0.00271
(0.74
log (Median 
HH Income) 
-0.132
(-0.43)
-0.234
(-0.68)
log (Income 
PC)
0.130
(0.64)
Constant 8.155*** 
(17.76)
8.136*** 
(17.72)
-0.835*** 
(-4.48)
-1.464*** 
(-5.12)
-1.639***
(-3.56)
 -1.592*** 
(-3.42)
-0.299 
(-0.10)
-0.415
(-0.14)
lns1_1_1 
Constant 
0.504*** 
(4.94)
0.504*** 
(4.94)
-1.526***
(-13.35)
 -1.189*** 
(-6.45)
-1.215***
(-6.14)
 -1.240*** 
(-6.03)
-1.262***
(-5.85)
 -1.248***
(-5.83)
Insig_e 
Constant 
-2.958*** 
(-50.19)
-3.012*** 
(-51.12)
-2.690*** 
(-44.26)
-3.007*** 
(-38.75)
-2.999*** 
(-36.93)
-2.992*** 
(-35.96)
-2.986***
(-34.75)
 -2.992***
(-35.00)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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TABLE 4. Multilevel Regression with Varying Intercepts for Log 
Number of Employees Given Type of Immigrant-Related Restrictive 
Ordinances Using Non-Restrictive Ordinances as Baseline
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 log 
(Employ~) 
log 
(Employ~) 
log 
(Employ~) 
log 
(Employ~)
log 
(Employ~) 
log 
(Employ~) 
log 
(Employ~)
log 
(Employ~)
2. Employment -1.755** 
(-2.66)
-1.755** 
(-2.66)
-0.294*** 
(-3.30)
-0.272** 
(-3.00)
-0.292** 
(-3.24)
-0.265**
(-2.90)
 -0.264**
(-2.87)
 -0.262**
(-2.84)
3. Housing -2.543
(-1.81) 
-2.543 
(-1.81)
-0.305 
(-1.65)
-0.299 
(-1.59)
-0.304 
(-1.65)
-0.294 
(-1.62)
-0.294
(-1.61)
 -0.291
(-1.59)
4. English -2.578** 
(-2.64)
-2.578** 
(-2.64)
-0.214 
(-1.61)
-0.225 
(-1.68)
-0.257 
(-1.92)
-0.239 
(-1.81)
-0.244 
(-1.83)
-0.243
(-1.83)
5. 287 (g)  0.660 
(0.79)
0.660 
(0.79)
0.0452 
(0.42)
0.0843 
(0.76)
0.0656 
(0.60)
0.129 
(1.06)
0.135 
(1.10)
0.135
(1.10)
Year 0.0363***
(7.52)
 0.0221*** 
(4.39)
0.0214***
(4.26)
 0.0187***
(3.51)
0.0205***
(3.67)
 0.0229**
(2.58)
0.0227*
(2.53)
log 
(Businesses) 
1.095***
(53.48)
 1.027*** 
(18.56)
1.032*** 
(18.94)
1.038*** 
(19.34)
1.034*** 
(18.95)
1.034***
(18.95)
log 
(Population) 
0.0678 
(1.31)
0.0702 
(1.38)
0.0663 
(1.32)
0.0696
(1.37)
0.0699
(1.38)
HH Growth -0.0248 
(-1.73)
-0.0209 
(-1.44)
-0.0201 
(-1.39)
-0.0208 
(-1.42)
-0.0213
(-1.44)
log (Median 
Home Value) 
-0.0586 
(-1.42)
-0.0306 
(-0.64)
-0.0267 
(-0.54)
-0.0249
(-0.50)
HH Income 
Ranking 
-0.00188 
(-1.14)
-0.000570 
(-0.14)
-0.000592
(-0.15)
log (Median 
HH Income) 
-0.122 
(-0.35)
-0.0884
(-0.23)
log (Income 
PC)
-0.0482
(-0.22)
Constant 10.59***
(20.58)
 10.53***
(20.47)
 1.620***
(9.03)
 1.436***
(5.96)
 2.090***
(4.07)
 1.824**
(3.24)
 3.011
(0.88)
 3.110
(0.90)
lns1_1_1 
Constant 
0.617*** 
(6.05)
0.618*** 
(6.05)
-1.450***
(-13.65)
 -1.441*** 
(-12.38)
-1.460*** 
(-12.50)
-1.479***
(-12.73)
 -1.474*** 
(-12.57)
-1.474***
(-12.56)
Insig_e 
Constant 
-2.427*** 
(-41.19)
-2.593***
(-44.00)
 -2.551*** 
(-43.11)
-2.567*** 
(-41.96)
-2.568*** 
(-41.95)
-2.566*** 
(-42.03)
-2.568*** 
(-41.90)
-2.568***
(-41.90)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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